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The Role of Arbitrator Ethics
Robert A. Holtzman*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a chain of pubs in Ireland called "The Honest Lawyer."
Displayed on the sign at the door of each location is a picture of a
barrister in the traditional gown. Unfortunately, however, his wigged
head is severed and rests on a tray he holds in one hand. The message
is clear: there is a widely held belief that the only honest lawyer is a
dead lawyer.
Many in today's business community would hold that the same is
true of arbitrators: there are no honest ones except those who are
dead. We in the profession are compelled to admit that there are anec-
dotal tales of bias, interest, or real corruption, but to our credit, these
are very few and far between. Whatever the reality, however, arbitra-
tors must be cognizant of and deal with the appearance. This article
will explore the systems, procedures, structures, and mechanisms that
arbitrators have created to assure honesty, integrity, and freedom
from bias and corruption and suggest some areas for improvement.
I will address commercial, construction, consumer, and employment
arbitration in the United States,1 arguing that arbitration is in reality
the diametric opposite of its perceived image. The profession of arbi-
tration-and today it is a profession-is not only cognizant of the crit-
icisms that have been leveled against it but has long since embarked
on a process of internal self-regulation far beyond anything required
by the user public. Through this process, arbitration seeks to avoid not
only impropriety but also any appearance of impropriety. We com-
monly refer to this process as "arbitrator ethics."
* Robert A. Holtzman, a member of the California Bar, is "Of Counsel - Retired" to Loeb &
Loeb LLP in its Los Angeles Office. He is a commercial arbitrator and mediator and a founding
Fellow of the College of Commercial Arbitrators.
1. Labor-management arbitration has somewhat different, but equally established, standards
and principles and thus will not be discussed in this article.
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II. ARBITRATOR ETHICS AND THE ROLE OF THE
INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATOR
A. The Ethics Codes
The cadre of people who serve as arbitrators is drawn from many
sources. Most function as members of panels created by institutional
providers. In commercial and construction arbitration, the best known
providers are the American Arbitration Association, the Judicial Ar-
bitration and Mediation Services, Inc. (hereinafter "JAMS"), CPR In-
ternational Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, and the
National Arbitration Forum, but there are many more. Some of these
organizations also provide consumer and employment arbitrators. The
Better Business Bureau, local real estate boards, and panels spon-
sored by local bar associations, government agencies, and other com-
munity-based organizations provide consumer and employment
arbitration as well. In addition, there are myriad "ad hoc," or non-
administered arbitrations, in which the parties or their party-ap-
pointed arbitrators select a neutral arbitrator. In some industries, such
as reinsurance, this ad hoc system is the norm.
The arbitrators affiliated with major providers are usually attorneys,
but may also be architects, engineers, building contractors, and busi-
ness people from many different sectors. They regard themselves as
professionals, have ordinarily gone through training that emphasizes
professional standards and responsibilities, and are-or at least should
be-cognizant of arbitrator ethics principles. Some ad hoc arbitrators
may equally be regarded as professionals, but many are drawn from
the industry involved in the case and lack specialized knowledge of
the arbitration process.
The ethics codes and the principles they articulate are generally well
known to arbitrators serving on established panels and those who reg-
ularly serve in ad hoc proceedings. The ethics codes have been
adopted or sponsored in some form by the major providers. They are
the subject of training programs, seminars, rules, and published manu-
als. The April 2009 meeting of the American Bar Association Section
of Dispute Resolution devoted an entire "track" of panel discussions
to neutral ethics. However, there is no known mechanism to bring
arbitrator ethics to the attention of persons selected to serve in ad hoc
proceedings because of their business or industry experience and acu-
men, without training in the arbitration process. This is a part of the
image problem for which there is yet no solution.
The sine qua non of arbitration is that the parties trust the process.
Arbitrators must not only be totally free from bias in every case they
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undertake to decide, they must also be free from any appearance of
bias. To this end, arbitrators have developed and impose upon them-
selves ethical codes, which were promulgated to provide formal gui-
dance to all persons serving as arbitrators in administered as well as
ad hoc arbitrations, whether pursuant to contract, court-order, or by
submission. The codes of ethics generally carry no sanctions for their
breach. They are wholly aspirational. Notwithstanding the absence of
compulsion, adherence to them is crucial to public confidence in, and
the continued viability of, the arbitration process.2
This article will refer in detail only to the Code of Ethics for Arbi-
trators in Commercial Disputes originally prepared in 1977 and exten-
sively revised in 2004 by representatives of the American Bar
Association and American Arbitration Association, with major input
from the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution,
the National Arbitration Forum, members of the academic commu-
nity, and other interested organizations and individuals (hereinafter
"the 2004 Code"). 3
B. Self-Examination
As both an ethical and a practical matter, the initial determination
whether a potential arbitrator should take on a tendered case must be
made by the arbitrator. The 2004 Code states that an arbitrator should
only accept appointment if he or she is satisfied of the following:
2. As will be discussed below, the courts consider arbitrator ethical standards, particularly
those relating to disclosure, where awards are sought to be set aside for evident partiality or
misconduct by the arbitrator.
3. AMERICAN ARBITRATION AssOCIATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE CODE ON
ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon I, B (2004), available at http://
www.adr.org/si.asp?id=4582 [hereinafter THE 2004 CODE]. Other domestic sources include:
JAMS, ARBITRATORS ETHICS GUIDELINES (2003), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/arbitra-
tion/ethics.asp; NATIONAL ARBITRATION FORUM, CODE OF PROCEDURE (2008), available at
http://www.adrforum.com/main.aspx?itemlD=609&hideBar=False&navlD=162&news=3; CPR
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, 2007 RULES FOR NON-
ADMINISTERED PROCEEDINGS, available at http://www.cpradr.org/Clauses/Rules; ETHICAL STAN-
DARDS FOR NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS IN CONTRACTUAL ARBITRATION, CAL. RULES OF COURT,
Appen., Div. V1 (2002), available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/documents/pdfFiles/eth-
ics standardsneutralarbitrators.pdf [hereinafter CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS] and pro-
visions of federal and state law, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq., REVISED
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/uarba/
arbitratl213.htm. International sources include: INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA
GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2004), available at
http://www.ibanet.org[ENews-Archive/IBA-July2_ 008-ENews-ArbitrationMultipleLang.aspx;
INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ICDR INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION PROCEDURES: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES (2008), available at http://www.
adr.org/sp.asp?id=28819 and numerous regional and national arbitration tribunals.
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(1) that he or she can serve impartially; (2) that he or she can serve
independently from the parties, potential witnesses, and the other
arbitrators; (3) that he or she is competent to serve; and (4) that he
or she can be available to commence the arbitration in accordance
with the requirements of the proceeding and thereafter to devote
the time and attention to its completion that the parties are reasona-
bly entitled to expect.4
The Comment to Canon I adds:
A prospective arbitrator is not necessarily partial or prejudiced by
having acquired knowledge of the parties, the applicable law or the
customs and practices of the business involved. Arbitrators may also
have special experience or expertise in the areas of business, com-
merce, or technology which are involved in the arbitration. Arbitra-
tors do not contravene this Canon if, by virtue of such experience or
expertise, they have views on certain general issues likely to arise in
the arbitration, but an arbitrator may not have prejudged any of the
specific factual or legal determinations to be addressed during the
arbitration. 5
Furthermore, Subparagraph C of Canon I provides:
After accepting appointment and while serving as an arbitrator, a
person should avoid entering into any business, professional, or per-
sonal relationship, or acquiring any financial or personal interest,
which is likely to affect impartiality or which might reasonably cre-
ate the appearance of partiality...6
Stated another way, the potential arbitrator must be satisfied in his
or her own mind at the outset that he or she is impartial, independent,
competent, available to serve, and has no interest or relationship-
and will not acquire any-which is likely to affect impartiality during
and for a reasonable time after the arbitration. If the arbitrator is not
satisfied that this is the case, the arbitrator should decline the appoint-
ment or recuse him or herself. This introspective analysis is the first
level of protection and is indispensable.
The 2004 Code provides that the existence of any of the matters or
circumstances described in Subparagraph C does not render it unethi-
cal for one to serve as arbitrator if the parties have consented to the
arbitrator's appointment following full disclosure. 7 However, service
as a neutral arbitrator in a case where there is apparent absence of
impartiality or interest carries with it such an appearance of impropri-
ety that the arbitrator would be well advised to decline the appoint-
ment, even if the parties consented to the arbitrator's appointment.
4. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon I, B.
5. Id. Comment to Canon I.
6. Id. Canon I, C.
7. See id. See also id. Canon II, F.
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Subparagraph B of Canon I highlights two of the critical differences
between arbitration and court proceedings." It references an arbitra-
tor's "competence to serve," which is aimed at the potential arbitra-
tor's confidence in his or her ability to take on a particularly complex
or technical case. 9 The parties will also have the ability to consider the
arbitrator's qualifications as they review biographical data. There is no
counterpart to this in classic litigation where one must accept the as-
signed judge.
The second critical difference involves the reference in Subpara-
graph B of Canon I to an arbitrator's availability to commence and
complete the arbitration in accordance with the case's requirements
and the reasonable expectations of the parties.10 This assures the par-
ties that the potential arbitrator is satisfied that he or she can provide
the parties with as expeditious a hearing and determination as the na-
ture and circumstances of the case will permit-one of arbitration's
most important attributes.
C. Disclosure of Interests or Relationships
1. The Process
The second level of protection is the disclosure process. Generally,
disclosure occurs after the parties and their counsel have reviewed the
resumes of potential arbitrators and are ready to make their selection.
The disclosure process permits the parties to make informed decisions
as to who will decide their case, and protects awards against later
claims of unknown bias or interest. When carried out fully and prop-
erly, the disclosure process enables arbitrators to demonstrate to the
parties and their counsel the arbitrator's intention and ability to serve
without bias or interest. It also allows the parties to reject the arbitra-
tor if they are unsatisfied with the arbitrator's ability to serve impar-
tially. I regard full, candid disclosure as the most critical step in the
process.
Pursuant to the 2004 Code, prior to accepting an appointment, po-
tential arbitrators should disclose the following:
(1) Any known direct or indirect financial or personal interest in the
outcome of the arbitration; (2) Any known existing or past finan-
cial, business, professional or personal relationships which might
reasonably affect impartiality or lack of independence in the eyes of
any of the parties. For example, prospective arbitrators should dis-
8. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon I, B.
9. Id.
10. Id.
2009]
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close any such relationships which they personally have with any
party or its lawyer, with any co-arbitrator, or with any individual
whom they have been told will be a witness. They should also dis-
close any such relationships involving their families or household
members or their current employers, partners, or professional or
business associates that can be ascertained by reasonable efforts; (3)
The nature and extent of any prior knowledge they may have of the
dispute; and (4) Any other matters, relationships, or interests which
they are obligated to disclose by the agreement of the parties, the
rules or practices of an institution, or applicable law regulating arbi-
trator disclosure. 11
Ordinarily, these disclosures are made in writing, and the parties and
their attorneys should be afforded adequate time to review them.
If a party objects to a proposed arbitrator who has not yet been
agreed to, there is simply no agreement and no appointment. If an
objected-to arbitrator has already been appointed or agreed to, the
arbitrator will in most cases withdraw. Some institutions, such as the
American Arbitration Association, reserve the power to pass on ob-
jections which may be deemed frivolous or baseless.12
The duty to disclose continues throughout the arbitration, and re-
quires an arbitrator to disclose, as soon as possible, any interests or
relationships which may arise or are recalled or discovered during the
course of the arbitration. 13
2. Interests
Deciding what to disclose also requires introspective analysis. For-
tunately, guidelines exist. The 2004 Code requires arbitrators to dis-
close "any known direct or indirect financial or personal interest in
the outcome of the arbitration. '14 The term financial interest is used
in its ordinary sense to mean that if the arbitrator's economic status
may be affected-positively or negatively-by any potential outcome
of the case, then the arbitrator has a financial interest. This may in-
clude, for example, an ownership of corporate stock or a share in a
partnership or limited liability company that is a party involved in the
case.
11. Id. Canon II, A.
12. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIA-
TION PROCEDURES, R-17(b) (2007), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440. The Cali-
fornia state courts have held that the public policy underlying the code provision requiring an
arbitrator to withdraw following timely objection based on a disclosure without regard to its
merit overrides the Association's reserved power to pass on the sufficiency of objections. CAL.
CODE CIv. P. § 1281.91(b); see Azteca Constr. Inc. v. ADR Constr. Inc., 121 Cal.App.4th 1156
(Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
13. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon II, C.
14. Id. Canon II, A.
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The 2004 Code does not provide a materiality standard. Arguably, if
the amount or rights in controversy are so minimal that the value of
the stock or share will not be affected by any potential outcome or the
amount of the arbitrator's investment is insignificant in light of his or
her overall estate, the arbitrator's interest should not be a matter of
concern. In his classic concurring opinion in Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., Justice White wrote:
Of course, an arbitrator's business relationships may be diverse in-
deed, involving more or less remote commercial connections with
great numbers of people. He cannot be expected to provide the par-
ties with his complete and unexpurgated business biography. But it
is enough for present purposes to hold, as the Court does, that
where the arbitrator has a substantial interest in a firm which has
done more than trivial business with a party, that fact must be dis-
closed ...15
With respect to relationships, the potential arbitrator need disclose
only those which might reasonably affect impartiality or lack of inde-
pendence "in the eyes of any of the parties."'1 6 No similar limitation
appears as to interests. The prevailing view is that if the potential arbi-
trator-or the arbitrator's spouse or any family member living in the
home-holds any such interest, however minimal, disclosure is in
order.17
The 2004 Code does not define "personal interest." In their discus-
sions, the authors referred to their expectation that it would reach any
non-economic interests the arbitrator might have, such as those aris-
ing out of significant personal involvement in public or civic or relig-
ious institutions, schools, clubs or fraternities, and the like.
3. Relationships
The 2004 Code requires that prior to accepting a request to serve as
arbitrator, the arbitrator disclose relationships that might affect
impartiality:
Any known existing or past financial, business, professional or per-
sonal relationships which might reasonably affect partiality or lack
of independence in the eyes of any of the parties. For example, pro-
15. 393 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968).
16. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon III, A.
17. By way of example, the California Ethical Standards require disclosure of any financial
interest in a party or in the subject matter of the arbitration on the part of the arbitrator or
member of the arbitrator's family. CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7-
d(9),(10). However, the definition of "financial interest" excludes interests in parties amounting
to less that one percent or having value of less than $1500, and indirect ownership of securities
through shares in a mutual fund in any amount. CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note
3, Standard 1(i), (incorporating CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 170.5(b)).
2009]
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spective arbitrators should disclose any such relationships which
they personally have with any party or its lawyer, or any co-arbitra-
tor, or with any individual whom they have been told will be a wit-
ness. They should also disclose any such relationships involving
their families or household members or their current employers,
partners, or professional or business associates that can be ascer-
tained by reasonable efforts. 18
Failure to disclose relationships has been a ground for court vacatur
of awards under the rubric of "evident partiality" in a number of
cases. However, the disclosure duty was not expressly set forth in the
Federal Arbitration Act or the Uniform Act, which was adopted by
forty-nine states.1 9 The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (2000) codi-
fied the disclosure duty:
[An arbitrator shall] ... disclose to all parties ... and to any other
arbitrators any known facts that a reasonable person would consider
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator... including ... an
existing or past relationship with any of the parties .... their coun-
sel or representatives, a witness, or another arbitrator...z0
The Comment to Section 12 describes the juridical basis for the new
proposed uniform statute.21
In Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Properties, Inc., the District
Court vacated an award based on alleged conduct by a party-ap-
pointed arbitrator inconsistent with the Code of Ethics.22 Reversing
the decision below, the Eighth Circuit pointed out that the Code of
Ethics itself provided that it "does not form a part of the arbitration
rules of the American Arbitration Association," nor does it "establish
new or additional grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards. '2 3
The court then stated that "[i]t is well-settled that only the statutory
grounds in Sec. 10(a) of the Act justify vacating an award; arbitration
rules and ethical codes 'do not have the force of law." 24
In the 2004 Code, "known" simply means that which is actually
known or that which is capable of becoming known by a reasonable
effort. 25 In Schmitz v. Zilveti, the appellants charged an arbitrator with
evident partiality because he failed to reveal that his law firm had rep-
resented the parent company of the corporate respondent.2 6 The arbi-
18. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon II, A(2).
19. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq.; UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr (2000).
20. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr § 12(a)(2).
21. Id. Comment to Section 12.
22. 280 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2001).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 820 (quoting Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 680 (7th 1983).
25. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon II, B.
26. 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994).
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trator was unaware of this representation.27 He had checked his firm's
records to determine if it had done business with the respondent, but
not its parent.28 The Ninth Circuit vacated the award, finding an ap-
pearance of bias based on the inadequate search. 29
Similarly, in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine
Ticaret Ve Sanayi, the Second Circuit vacated an award where the ar-
bitrator learned of a potential conflict during the arbitration and dis-
closed it, but only in terms indicating it to be trivial. 30 His deliberate
failure to investigate it further and disclose the results of such an in-
vestigation constituted evident partiality. In New Regency Produc-
tions, Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that
where circumstances developed during an arbitration indicating a
need to investigate a potential relationship, the arbitrator's failure to
investigate was in itself evident partiality.31
There are no ground rules for how far back into the past one must
disclose.32 The California Ethics Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in
Contract Arbitration (hereinafter "California Ethics Standards") use
two years as a cut-off.33 The California Ethics Standards were devel-
oped by the California Judicial Council in response to a legislative
mandate; they were promulgated by the Supreme Court in 2002, re-
vised extensively in 2003, and may be found at the Appendix to the
California Rules of Court, Division I.34 The drafters were particu-
larly concerned with perceived inadequacy in disclosure of business
relationships, and attempted to particularize the types of relationships
that, in their estimation, must be disclosed. After setting forth a duty
to disclose in language very close to that of the 2004 Code-to "...
disclose all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to
reasonably entertain a doubt that the proposed arbitrator would be
able to be impartial... "35-they went on to require disclosure of rela-
tionships in very specific terms:
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1049.
30. 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007).
31. 501 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007).
32. However, the author has disclosed prior relationships thirty years earlier and fifty years
earlier and in each case a party thanked and excused him. The records of my firm are fairly
complete and accurate over a twenty-year period and my practice is to disclose anything they
reveal that is otherwise discloseable. I will go back even farther if the relationship was of impor-
tance to me (as in the thirty-year-old and fifty-year-old cases) or would, in my estimation, be
important from the perspective of any party.
33. CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 3.
34. Id.
35. CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7(d).
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The arbitrator or a member of the arbitrator's immediate or ex-
tended family is a party, a party's spouse or domestic partner, or an
officer, director or trustee of a party ["immediate family" and "ex-
tended family" are defined terms] .... The arbitrator or the arbitra-
tor's spouse, former spouse, domestic partner, child, sibling, or
parent is a lawyer in the arbitration, the spouse or domestic partner
is (A) A lawyer in the arbitration; (B) The spouse or domestic part-
ner of a lawyer in the arbitration; or currently associated in the
private practice of law with a lawyer in the arbitration.... The arbi-
trator or a member of the arbitrator's immediate family has or has
had a significant personal relationship with any party or a lawyer for
a party .... The arbitrator is serving or, within the preceding five
years, has served [as a neutral or party-appointed arbitrator in a
prior or pending case involving a party to the current arbitration or
an attorney for a party.36
Additionally, the arbitrator must disclose: whether the arbitrator is
serving or has served as a compensated dispute resolution neutral
other than as arbitrator involving a party or attorney for a party;
whether the arbitrator has or has recently discussed any arrangement
with a party for compensated services as a dispute resolution neutral;
whether the arbitrator has or has had any attorney-client relationship
with a party or lawyer for a party (as defined); whether the arbitrator
has or has had any other professional relationship with a party or law-
yer for a party, including specifically association in the private practice
of law, employment, or service as expert witness or as consultant;
whether the arbitrator or member of the arbitrator's immediate family
has a financial interest in a party or in the subject matter of the arbi-
tration; whether the arbitrator or a member of the arbitrator's imme-
diate family has an interest that could be substantially affected by the
outcome of the arbitration; and whether the arbitrator or a member of
the arbitrator's immediate or extended family has personal knowledge
of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.37
Much of the law requiring disclosure of arbitrator relationships
stems from Commonwealth.38 There, a supposedly neutral arbitrator,
selected by two party-appointed arbitrators, failed to disclose that the
firm he headed had over a period of time supplied engineering ser-
vices to a party, including services on the projects involved in the arbi-
tration.39 Reversing the court below, the Supreme Court held that the
failure to disclose the relationship constituted evident partiality or un-
36. CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 3, Standard 7(d).
37. See CALIFORNIA ETHICAL STANDARDS, supra note 3.
38. Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
39. Id. at 146.
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due means within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act. 40 The
plurality opinion written by Justice Black and the concurring opinion
written by Justice White agreed that failure to disclose a substantial
interest in a firm that did more than trivial business with a party re-
quired vacatur of the award. 41
While the business relationship in Commonwealth is undoubtedly a
required subject of disclosure, courts have struggled to draw the line
between relationships of sufficient moment to require disclosure, and
those which are of a trivial nature, and thus do not require disclosure.
For example, in Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mort-
gage Corp., the attorney arbitrator failed to disclose a prior profes-
sional association-that he and one of the parties' attorneys were co-
counsel for an unrelated client-with a member of one of the law
firms in the case.42 The court concluded that the Federal Arbitration
Act did not mandate the extreme remedy of vacatur for nondisclosure
of what it deemed a trivial past association.43
Positive Software adopted the view that there is a distinction be-
tween the statutory "evident partiality" standard and the "reasonable
impression of partiality" Ethics Code standard, a distinction illus-
trated by the divergence between Justice Black's plurality opinion in
Commonwealth and Justice White's concurring opinion in the case.44
The Positive Software court concluded that the majority of circuit
courts have found that the Supreme Court's disagreement in Com-
monwealth compels the conclusion that the majority of the Court did
not equate "appearance of bias" with "evident partiality" and that
only the Ninth Circuit has adopted a contrary rule.45
In Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP v. Koch, an arbitrator
recognized trial counsel who appeared unexpectedly at the hearing
and a potential expert witness as past fellow members of the board of
the Business Trial Lawyers Association and the American Inns of
Court.46 The arbitrator promptly disclosed the relationships and then
denied a motion for disqualification based on the disclosures. 47 JAMS
concurred in his decision. Following the hearing and issuance of the
award, the claimant petitioned the California Superior Court to con-
firm the award. The respondents petitioned to vacate it on the ground
40. Id. at 151-52.
41. Id.
42. 476 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. 2007).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 288 (citing Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043 (9th 1994)).
46. 162 Cal.App.4th 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
47. Id.
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that the disclosures were required under the California statute and
thus entitled them to disqualification as a matter of right. 48 Thus, the
issue was whether these were required disclosures. 49 The court con-
cluded that serving on the boards of two professional organizations,
standing alone and without any indication of a business relationship,
was not ground for disqualification and that the disclosures, although
made, were not required under the mandatory disqualification stat-
ute.50 The Superior Court confirmed the award and on appeal its deci-
sion was affirmed.
In analyzing the issue presented by the appeal the Appellate Court
quoted with approval two passages from its earlier decision in John-
ston v. Security Insurance Co. of Hartford,51 which quoted language
from Commonwealth. The first was from Justice Black's majority
opinion, and read:
It is true that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business
world, since they are not expected to get all their income from their
work deciding cases, but we should, if anything, be even more
scrupulous to safeguard the impartiality of arbitrators than judges,
since the former have completely free rein to decide the law as well as
the facts and are not subject to appellate review. We can perceive of
no way in which the effectiveness of the arbitration process will be
hampered by the simple requirement that arbitrators disclose to the
parties any dealings that might create an impression of possible
bias.52
The second was from Justice White's concurring opinion, and read:
The arbitration process functions best when an amicable and trust-
ing atmosphere is preserved and there is voluntary compliance with
the decree, without need for judicial enforcement. This end is best
served by establishing an atmosphere of frankness at the onset,
through disclosure by the arbitrator of any financial transactions
which he has had or is negotiating with either of the parties ... 53
The Luce court then picked up on the emphasis in both Common-
wealth opinions on business or financial matters.54 Luce cited a line of
cases, including Johnston, which turned on the presence or absence of
an acquaintanceship involving a substantial business relationship, and
cited the following statement with approval:
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 6 Cal.App.3d 839 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
52. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP v. Koch, 162 Cal.App.4th 720, 731 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008) (citing Johnston v. Security Ins. Co. of Hartford, 6 Cal.App.3d 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App.
1970) (quoting Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968))).
53. Id.
54. Id
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Social acquaintance, even of long duration and of a personal nature,
without a substantial business relationship does not create an im-
pression of possible bias ... ; [m]embership in a professional organi-
zation does not provide a credible basis for inferring an impression
of bias ... to create an impression of possible bias that therefore
requires disclosure, a business relationship must be substantial and
involve financial consideration. 55
The court concluded by pointing out that Commonwealth recognized
that arbitrators cannot sever all their ties with the business world and
stating that "the same is true of professional obligations involving ser-
vice to the legal community and the public, continuing education for
bar members and mentoring for new lawyers."'56
Finally, in Guseinov v. Burns, the court considered whether an arbi-
trator's failure to disclose his prior service as a pro bono mediator in
an unrelated case in which one of the attorneys in the arbitration rep-
resented a party required vacatur.57 The court held that the mediation
was an ordinary and insubstantial business dealing not requiring
disclosure.58
There is thus a distinction between what must be disclosed and what
should be disclosed. 59 The general rule remains: when in doubt
disclose.60
4. Other Subjects of Disclosure
Potential arbitrators should disclose the nature or extent of any
prior knowledge they may have of the dispute. 61 They should also dis-
close any other matters required by the agreement of the parties, the
rules or practices of the administering institution, or applicable law.62
Although the 2004 Code is structured to require disclosure only of
"interests" and "relationships," together with any other matters re-
55. Id. at 732.
56. Id. at 734.
57. Guseinov v. Burns, 145 Cal.App.4th 944 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
58. Id. at 958-59.
59. Although no economic consideration was involved, I have without hesitation disclosed my
relationship with persons I worked long and closely with on Bar Association committees, but not
casual acquaintanceship with Association members. I have disclosed my relationships with fel-
low members of mid-sized boards of directors of non-profit community organizations. I have
disclosed service as a mediator, whether compensated or uncompensated, where parties to a
proposed arbitration or their attorneys appeared before me. Perhaps these were not mandated,
but I based my decisions to disclose on the premise that these were relationships the parties
would prefer to know about.
60. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon II, A(4).
61. Id. Canon II, A(3).
62. Id. Canon II, A(4).
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quired by applicable rules, practices, or laws, 63 practice generally has
advocated disclosing not only these specific matters but also anything
else that a reasonable party would consider likely to affect impartial-
ity. This concept was adopted by the Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act, which specifically provides that a prospective arbitrator ".... shall
disclose . . . any known facts that a reasonable person would consider
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator in the arbitration pro-
ceeding, including [the interests and relationships discussed above]." 64
The authors of the 2004 Code considered requiring potential arbi-
trators to disclose prior professional or personal life experiences re-
sembling the subject matter of the dispute tendered to them, but
rejected such a requirement as excessively vague and subjective. The
issue was later raised in O'Flaherty v. Belgum in which the losing party
complained that the arbitrator in a case involving a law firm break-up
did not disclose that he had been personally involved in a remotely
similar dispute.65 The case was decided on other grounds but the dis-
sent considered the issue at length, ultimately concluding that the per-
sonal or professional facts presented would not have justified
vacatur.66
D. Role of the Parties
Parties have a concomitant duty to make known, at the disclosure
stage, any relevant information they have that the arbitrator over-
looked. A party that fails to do so may waive the right to vacate or to
oppose confirmation based on such information. 67
E. Other Ethical Obligations
With limited exceptions, a prospective arbitrator or arbitrator
should not discuss any matter relating to the arbitration with any party
or counsel outside the presence of the others or communicate in writ-
ing with one side's party or counsel without sending a copy to the
other. This rule does not apply to hearings where a party who has
received due notice does not appear. If an arbitrator receives a written
63. Id.
64. UNIF. ARBITRATION Acr (2000).
65. 115 Cal.App.4th 1044 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
66. Id. at 1106.
67. Fidelity Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 2006), Delta Mine
Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Properties, Inc., 280 F.3d 815 (8th Cir. 2001), See also Guseinov v.
Burns, 145 Cal.App.4th 944 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Fininen v. Barlow, 142 Cal.App.4th 185,
191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006)).
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communication concerning the case which has not been sent to the
other parties, the arbitrator should send copies to them.68
Canon VI provides that an arbitrator is in a relationship of trust to
the parties.69 Thus, he or she should not use or disclose confidential
information acquired during the arbitration, and should adhere to the
reasonable expectations of the parties regarding the confidentiality of
all aspects of the proceeding. Normally, those expectations anticipate
that the arbitrator should keep confidential all matters relating to the
arbitration proceedings and decision. The expectation of confidential-
ity is another fundamental difference between arbitration and classic
litigation. While the confidentiality of the result will vanish if the
award is spread on the public record by court proceedings to confirm
or vacate, the arbitrator should not assist in proceedings to enforce or
challenge the award.
Earlier prohibitions on arbitrator advertising or promotion van-
ished as a result of First Amendment challenge of similar professional
limitations. The 2004 Code permits arbitrators to engage in advertis-
ing or promotion of their services, in person or through any medium,
which is truthful, accurate, and does not imply any willingness to ac-
cept an appointment other than in accordance with the 2004 Code.70
F. Party Appointed Arbitrators
The most radical departure of the 2004 Code from its predecessors
lay in its treatment of arbitrators appointed by one party and serving
in a non-neutral capacity. Under the 2004 Code, all arbitrators, even
those appointed by a party, are presumed to be neutral and thus sub-
ject to all obligations of the 2004 Code. 71 Arbitrators are required to
take appropriate steps to determine how the parties expected them to
serve and to communicate the results of this inquiry. If the arbitrators
determine and advise the parties and other arbitrators that their ap-
pointment contemplates service as non-neutrals, they may do so. In
that event, the arbitrators are nevertheless subject to the obligations
of the 2004 Code, except for those made expressly inapplicable to
their status by Canon X.72
Consistent with this view, the Eighth Circuit held in Delta Mine that
where a party-appointed arbitrator disclosed that he would communi-
cate with the party that had appointed him throughout the arbitration,
68. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3, Canon III.
69. Id. Canon VI.
70. Id. Canon VIII.
71. Id.
72. Id. Canon X.
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would function as an advocate for that party, and then proceeded to
do so, the objecting party failed to demonstrate that the arbitrator's
conduct misled the other arbitrators, prevented the objector from
fairly presenting its case, or otherwise prejudiced the outcome of the
arbitration. 73
III. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS AND INSTITUTIONS
Notwithstanding the more rigorous statutory requirement for vaca-
tur, courts have referred to and at times relied upon arbitrator ethical
standards, especially those requiring disclosure, in determining
whether to confirm or vacate awards under the rubric of evident mis-
conduct. The problem is that if an award is not confirmed or is va-
cated, the punishment did not fit the crime. The winning party, who
labored at great expense to obtain a result in contested arbitration, is
deprived of the benefit of an award which may or may not have been
tainted by misfeasance on the part of the arbitrator with which the
party had no involvement or responsibility. There is no economic im-
pact on the arbitrator, who is immune from civil liability. The eco-
nomic burden is cast upon the party who, having once prevailed, must
try the case again.
The administering institutions attempt to train and indoctrinate
their panel members, constantly reminding them of their obligations
and in some instances supplying elaborate disclosure checklists tai-
lored to local law and practice. The American Arbitration Association
has adopted a policy whereby arbitrators on its panels may be placed
on inactive status whenever any of their awards are challenged in
court based on allegations that the arbitrator failed to properly dis-
close a relationship. Generally, inactive status will permit the arbitra-
tor to proceed with existing cases, but he or she will not be considered
for appointment on new cases. At the conclusion of the court chal-
lenge proceeding, the American Arbitration Association will make a
determination whether to return the arbitrator to active status or re-
move him or her from its roster of neutrals.
IV. CONCLUSION
Both the 2004 Code and its 1977 predecessor advise us that few
cases of unethical behavior by commercial arbitrators have arisen.74
Over thirty years since the 1977 Code was promulgated, this proposi-
73. Delta Mine Holding Co. v. AFC Coal Properties, Inc., 280 F.3d 815, 820 (8th Cir. 2001).
74. THE 2004 CODE, supra note 3; AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION AND AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, THE CODE ON ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (1977).
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tion remains true. The reported cases of unethical behavior are few,
and many have turned out to be post hoc efforts to set aside an ad-
verse award resulting in full exoneration of the neutral. The process
continues to be attacked based on a few unfortunate incidents, anec-
dotal evidence, and just plain misconceptions. The mission of the pro-
fession is then to rebut not so much impropriety but the claimed
appearance of impropriety. The Ethics Codes, fully subscribed to and
rigorously adhered to, provide tools that can be used toward this end.

